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ABSTRACT
Abstract. This paper discusses the nature of genomic information, and the moral
arguments in support of an individual’s right to access it. It analyses the legal avenues an
individual might take to access their sequence information. The authors describe the
policy implications in this area and conclude that, for now, the law appears to strike an
appropriate balance, but new policy will need to be developed to address this issue.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The Human Genome Project was a collaborative effort by many scientists and labora-
tories around the world, and resulted in the human genome being sequenced for the
ﬁrst time.1 Completed in 2001,2 this landmark scientiﬁc project has provided a
unique reference library for the scientiﬁc community. It is estimated to have cost US
$2.7 billion and involved 20 different laboratories around the world.3 As sequencing
technology is improving, it is becoming less experimental and more routine. The
© The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 FS Collins, M Morgan, and A Patrinos, ‘The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology’
(2003) 300 Science 286–90.
2 See the special issue of Nature (2001) 409, 745–964.
3 National Human Genome Research Institute, ‘Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked
Questions’ (genome.gov) <http://www.genome.gov/11006943> accessed 12 March 2013.
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result is that sequencing costs are falling and the possibility of a whole genome being
sequenced for $1000 is getting closer.4 With the advances in next-generation sequenc-
ing technology, we are now entering a new phase where individual whole genome
sequencing will no longer be the sole domain of specialist laboratories involving con-
siderable effort, time, and expense. Whole genome sequencing is fast becoming a
technology that will start to be used routinely by researchers and ultimately will
be employed within the clinic to assist with personalised diagnosis and treatment
strategies.5
Up until now, best practice has been that research participants were not given
access to their sequence information produced through the research process. This
approach is increasingly being questioned as sequencing costs fall and sequencing
techniques are becoming more robust and richer in the amount of detail they can
detect, which has implications for diagnosis and treatment. As research knowledge
increases, the clinical utility of sequence information is also improving. There are a
number of genes that indicate an elevated risk of serious treatable conditions, such as
the gene for the low density lipoprotein receptor which indicates an increased risk of
familial hypercholesterolaemia that can be lowered by taking statins.6 At the same
time, the quality and quantity of the data continue to increase, making it increasingly
difﬁcult to anonymise sequence data, which is uniquely identiﬁable.7 Therefore, there
is increased potential to reveal ‘incidental’ ﬁndings—those ﬁndings that were not
anticipated at the start of the study8 or ﬁndings that have implications for individuals
and their families that may have previously been unknown. A recent report by the
American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) recommends that a limited menu of
incidental ﬁndings should be fed back to those who have had a genetic test in a clinical
setting. These should be fed back routinely through the clinical setting but do not
give the patient the opportunity to opt out of receiving the information.9 Having
access to this personal information may enable participants to better understand their
health conditions and make health-related decisions accordingly. The establishment
of a number of direct-to-consumer testing companies10 that allow individuals access
to their personal genome for a fee has also been a basis for questioning the policy of
not giving individuals access to their personal genome. This had led to a heated
debate within the bioethics and scientiﬁc community as to whether individuals should
be entitled to their own sequence information generated through the research
4 <http://genomics.xprize.org/> accessed 12 March 2013.
5 SF Kingsmore, ‘CJ Saunders, Deep Sequencing of Patient Genomes for Disease Diagnosis: When Will It
Become Routine?’ (2011) Sci Transl Med 3, 87ps23.
6 D Marks and others, ‘A Review on the Diagnosis, Natural History, and Treatment of Familial Hypercholes-
terolaemia’ (2003) 168(1) Atherosclerosis 1–14.
7 M Gymrek and others, ‘Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference’ (2013) 339 Science 321–
24; LL Rodriguez and others, ‘The Complexities of Genomic Identiﬁability’ (2013) 339 Science 275–6.
8 S Wolf and others, ‘Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommen-
dations’ (2008) 36 J Law Med Ethics 219.
9 RC Green and others, ‘ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome
and Genome Sequencing’ (2013) Genet Med doi:10.1038/gim.2013.73.
10 For some examples, see 23andMe <https://www.23andme.com/> and Navigenics <http://www.
navigenics.com/> accessed 30 July 2013.
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process.11 While there have been a number of papers that have advocated that there is
a moral obligation to disclose relevant risks to individuals,12 there have not been any
papers that have analysed whether individuals have a legal basis to access their own
personal genome information. The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the litera-
ture by analysing the legal position in the UK as to whether individuals have a right to
access their personal genome information (i.e. data rather than samples). We conﬁne
our main discussion to three heads of law that concern information—the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998 (DPA), the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), and the
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). It is worth noting that data protection law in the
UK is likely to undergo substantial change over the foreseeable future, due to a review
of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.13 Currently in the UK, there is no legisla-
tion that focuses speciﬁcally on patients’ rights, though at a European14 and interna-
tional level15 such legal instruments exist. Therefore, these heads of law are the
primary avenues through which an individual could base an action to obtain access to
their personal genome data within the UK.
This paper will ﬁrstly discuss the nature of sequence information and how it is
used in research, and then it will identify the type of research ﬁndings that might be of
interest to individuals or their families based on the genome sequence. Secondly, it
will discuss the moral arguments to support an individual’s right to access four differ-
ent types of research ﬁndings; these are raw sequence data, general research ﬁndings,
patient speciﬁc ﬁndings, and patient-speciﬁc incidental ﬁndings. Thirdly, it will
analyse the legal avenues open to individuals and whether it is possible for individuals
to obtain access to the four speciﬁc types of information that are generated through
the research process.16 Our conclusion is that there is currently no certain legal
avenue for participants through these heads of law, despite the fact that there are com-
pelling reasons why individuals might want to, and should have access to their
genome sequence. The ﬁnal section in this paper discusses the policy implications of
these ﬁndings, suggesting that currently the law strikes the right balance regarding
access to personal sequence information but that, as whole sequence information
becomes more commonplace in healthcare, this position will need to be reviewed.
11 See, for example, Susan M Wolf, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of the Debate over Return of Research
Results and Incidental Findings’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 355–7; BM Knoppers and others, ‘The Emergence
of an Ethical Duty to Disclose Genetic Research Results: International Perspectives’ (2006) 14 Eur J Hum
Genet 1170–8; V Ravitsky and BS Wilfond, ‘Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research Partici-
pants’ (2006) 6(6) Am J Bioeth 8–17; EW Clayton and others, ‘Managing Incidental Genomic Findings:
Legal Obligations of Clinicians’ [2013] Genet Med doi:10.1038/gim.2013.7.
12 See n 8 above.
13 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
14 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
Oviedo, 4.IV.1997.
15 UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997.
16 Under the Human Tissue Act 2004 s 45 it is possible to get access to a sample for DNA testing without
consent if it is approved by the HTA; A Lucassen and J Kaye, ‘Genetic Testing without Consent: The
Implications of the New Human Tissue Act 2004’ (2006) 32 J Med Ethics 690 doi:10.1136/
jme.2005.013631. However, for the purposes of this paper, we are focusing on sequence information and
therefore will not discuss the law concerning samples and access by individuals to samples.
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I I . THE NATURE OF GENOMIC INFORMATION
Genomic research is improving our understanding of how an individual’s DNA inheri-
tance may determine individual risk of disease or their response to or ability to metab-
olise drugs. The difference between whole genome sequencing and many of the
sequencing techniques that are in common use is that whole genome sequencing pro-
vides information that could be used to determine an individual or familial risk for a
number of conditions at the same time. The inherited nature of DNA means that
information has implications not just for the individual but also for other family
members.17 DNA can provide information that can be used for a number of different
purposes such as health-related reasons, for determining family-lineage and ethnic-
ity.18 Because of the sheer size of the genome and the information that it contains,
previous analysis techniques have only been able to scan small segments of the
genome on speciﬁc chromosomes. Therefore, until now the scientiﬁc enquiry has
been focused upon speciﬁc genes and diseases. As the technology improves, under-
standing of the functionality of the genome will also increase. The broader scope
afforded by improved technology will be able to encompass the relationship between
different parts of the genome and investigate the functioning of whole cells. This in
turn will inﬂuence the classiﬁcation of diseases and potentially how healthcare is orga-
nised. As the knowledge about the signiﬁcance of DNA for disease development
improves, the potential for this information to become more relevant for healthcare
will increase. Whole genome sequencing will therefore be able to be used to identify a
range of conditions simultaneously not just for the individual but also for other family
members.19
Another signiﬁcant feature of genomic information is that it is uniquely identiﬁable
to individuals: very small amounts of DNA may uniquely identify an individual.20
Medical researchers have traditionally utilised the twin pillars of consent and anonym-
isation to protect individuals involved in research. Current research governance
requires the anonymisation of samples through the removal of personal identiﬁers
when they are shared with other researchers. This means that the sequence data will
not be immediately identiﬁable. However, if the sequence data are held by third party
researchers with names and addresses, it will be possible to link the non-identiﬁable
sequence data with the sequence data that have names and addresses attached. The
nature of DNA is such that it may still be possible to select an individual from a group
and identify them, even if the researchers remove all their ‘external’ identiﬁers. In the
past, aggregated genomic information was publicly released, but this practice ceased
17 CA Cassa and others, ‘My Sister’s Keeper?: Genomic Research and the Identiﬁability of Siblings’ (2008) 1
BMCMed Genomics 32.
18 LM Beskow, ‘Considering the Nature of Individual Research Results’ (2006) 6(6) Am J Bioeth 38; KA
Quaid, NM Jessup, and EM Meslin, ‘Disclosure of Genetic Information Obtained Through Research’
(2004) 8 Genet Test 347; V Ravitsky and BS Wilfond, ‘Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research
Participants’ (2008) 6 (6) Am J Bioeth 8; D Wendler and E Emanuel, ‘The Debate Over Research on
Stored Biological Samples: What Do Sources Think? (2002) 162 Arch Intern Med 1457.
19 J Gitschier, ‘Inferential Genotyping of Y Chromosomes in Latter-Day Saints Founders and Comparison to
Utah Samples in the HapMap Project’ (2009) 84 Am J Hum Genet 251.
20 See for example Z Lin, AB Owen, and RB Altman, ‘Genetics. Genomic Research and Human Subject
Privacy’ (2004) 205 Science 183, discussed in C Heeney and others, ‘Assessing the Privacy Risks of Data
Sharing in Genomics’ (2011) 14 (1) Public Health Genomics 17.
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after researchers demonstrated that, when a reference sample is available, it is possible
to identify that individual out of a large aggregated sample.21
When whole genome sequencing is more commonplace, therefore, it will also be
possible to track the sequence data back through the research pathway just by looking
at the sequence data alone. This means that it would not be difﬁcult for a researcher
or institution to distinguish individual sequence data and possibly link it to other per-
sonally identiﬁable information even if the identiﬁers had been removed. Currently,
the systems in place are not designed to track individuals: management pathways
would have to be established to enable this to happen if individuals did want access to
their personal genome. However, in the future where whole genome sequencing
becomes commonplace, lack of tracking capability may no longer be the norm.
Already, whole genome or exome sequencing is being planned to occur more rou-
tinely in non-anonymised cohorts, which will make the linking straightforward.22 This
means that arguments against disclosure of personal information to participants on
the basis that participants are not identiﬁable are less robust.
I I I . WHAT TYPES OF INFORMATION MIGHT PARTICIPANTS
ACCESS?
Information which is generated in the course of research does not meet the same stan-
dards of quality control that are required for clinical care. In the research context, to
obtain sequence information, researchers must ﬁrst obtain a biological sample
(usually blood or saliva, but sometimes other types of tissue may be used). Questions
of access by individuals to physical samples are regulated by the statutory scheme in
the Human Tissue Act (HTA). Although the HTA regulates access to physical
samples, it does not regulate the ways in which research participants might obtain
access to information, and therefore the HTA is outside the scope of this paper,
where we focus on data.23 Information that is generated within a research context is
very different from information which is obtained through diagnosis and treatment
and is required for an individual’s clinical care. In the research context, the focus is on
a research question, in the ﬁrst instance on the treatment of particular individuals,
ﬁndings may not have clinical signiﬁcance for research participants, and research
sample handling systems do not have to be as rigorous as is the case in clinical work.
Information from a clinical diagnosis or intervention would be entered in a medical
record. Patients can obtain access to this information by using their rights under
various legal avenues.24 The information generated through research does not
21 N Homer and others, ‘Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex Mix-
tures using High-density SNP Genotyping Microarrays’ (2008) 4(8) PLoS Genet e1000167 <http://www.
plosgenetics.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pgen.1000167> accessed 12 March 2013.
22 See for example the plan for 100,000 NHS to have their whole genome sequenced: <http://www.
number10.gov.uk/news/dna-tests-to-ﬁght-cancer/> accessed 30 July 2013.
23 We recognise that the HTA might provide a means for a patient to obtain access to a physical sample, from
which they might obtain the genomic information, thus circumventing the law regulating access to infor-
mation. However, that patient would also be able to provide an additional sample from which DNA might
be obtained.
24 Legally, patients have an almost absolute right to access their medical record. This is not a common law
right (R v Mid Glamorgan FHSA ex p Martin [1995] 1 All ER 356) but is guaranteed through various statu-
tory rights contained within the Supreme Court Act 1981 (for discovery of medical records in the context
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necessarily ﬁnd its way into a person’s medical record and therefore cannot be rou-
tinely accessed. Therefore, it is important to understand whether there is a legal basis
for a participant to access personal sequence information.
There are different types of information which might be generated from genomic
research and which may be of interest to individuals. We have identiﬁed four different
types of information that fall under the description of ‘genomic information’ which
would be created through the various stages of the research process. Each of these
types of genomic information is subject to different types of legal controls or obliga-
tions depending on whether they can be linked to an identiﬁable living individual.
A. Raw Data
This consists of the SNP information,25 or genetic sequence information (either com-
plete, or exome sequence information),26 and can be represented as a read out of the
base pair sequence27 on an individual’s genome. Although the vast majority of the
general public (and indeed many genomic scientists) would be unable to interpret
this information to provide any meaningful conclusions, online applications28 (such
as SNPedia and Promethease) encourage members of the public to share their
genomic information in an open source manner, and also provide tools to conduct
genomic analysis. It is likely that such applications will become increasingly sophisti-
cated in the next few years and some medical practitioners may be able to draw mean-
ingful conclusions from the information. This type of information could be obtained
by providing a sample to a company which undertake either GWAS sequencing (such
as 23 and Me) or a company that carries out whole genome sequencing.
B. General Research Findings
These are the ﬁndings obtained from the analysis of the study and are generally pro-
vided through the scientiﬁc publications, and participant newsletters and websites.
The information is about the results of the study as a whole and does not provide
information at a patient speciﬁc level.
C. Participant-Speciﬁc Research Findings
These are the results of the particular study that have relevance to an individual
patient. These have been described as ‘pertinent’ ﬁndings in the UK10K study29 as
of litigation), the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Access to Health Records Act 1990, and the Data
Protection Act 1998. The NHS Constitution also provides for a right of access to a person’s own health
records, although this document is without any binding legal force.
25 Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies such as 23andMe or Navigenics are increasingly providing this
raw information to their customers. 23andMe provides access to raw data for some customers <https://
www.23andme.com/you/faqwin/usinggenomeexplorer> accessed 12 March 2013.
26 BC Venter and J Watson chose to make their whole genome sequence public in 2007–08; S Levy and
others, ‘The Diploid Genome Sequence of an Individual Human’ (2007) 5 (10) PLoS Biol e254 <http://
www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050254#aff3> accessed 12 March 2013; DA
Wheeler and others, ‘The Complete Genome of an Individual by Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing’
(2008) 452 Nature 872.
27 These base pairs are AGCT and make up the human genome.
28 See for example SNPedia <http://www.snpedia.com/index.php/SNPedia> and the associated Prome-
thease <http://www.snpedia.com/index.php/Promethease> accessed 30 July 2013.
29 UK10K Ethical Governance Framework <http://www.uk10k.org/ethics.html> accessed 12 March 2013.
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they may be ﬁndings that relate to the type of study that has been carried out, for
example, ﬁnding a particular genetic variant postulated to cause diabetes, in a patient
taking part in a diabetes study. Some research leads to information which is relevant
on a population level—and there may be relevant ﬁndings for a small number of par-
ticipants on an individual level—but research results may need to be veriﬁed by
further research. It is therefore not always clear at scientiﬁc level what this type of
feedback might involve, or what the ﬁndings might mean to an individual.
D. Participant-Speciﬁc Incidental Findings
This type of information refers to participant-speciﬁc ﬁndings that are not directly
related to the purpose of the study. Wolf et al. deﬁne incidental ﬁndings as ‘a ﬁnding
concerning an individual research participant that has potential health or reproductive
importance and is discovered in the course of conducting research but is beyond the
aims of the study’.30 For the purposes of this paper however, we wish to take a
broader perspective. Wolf’s deﬁnition limits incidental ﬁndings to those which might
have health or reproductive importance. Such information would include clinically
validated health ﬁndings such as a validated disease causing mutation, or a pharmaco-
genetic variant, and is clearly relevant information for the purpose of this paper. Inci-
dental ﬁndings might be ﬁndings that have already been validated by other research
and in some cases have already been used within a clinical setting. However, genomics
research may also uncover other information about a participant which may be of
interest to them, but which is not relevant to health or reproduction. The other type
of ﬁnding relates to ‘non-health’ issues such as ethnicity and non-paternity.31 We will
include this latter type of information in our deﬁnition of incidental ﬁndings.
IV. SHOULD INDIVIDUALS BE GIVEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH
INFORMATION?
The question of whether, and how, individuals can access information that comes to
light in the course of research goes to the heart of the researcher–participant relation-
ship; an understanding that needs to evolve in-line with changing scientiﬁc develop-
ments and social and cultural norms. The ethics of research involving human
participants rests on the value of respect for individuals, their dignity, and bodily integ-
rity. This value is enacted in the process of informed consent, which underscores volun-
tariness and includes the ability to withdraw from research.32 There is more to the
participant–researcher research relationship, however, than a simple willingness of one
individual to undergo an intervention for the beneﬁt of another’s research pursuit. This
30 See n 8 above.
31 We recognise that much of this information may also have some health or reproductive signiﬁcance, and
thus the extent to which such ﬁndings can be clearly separated from healthcare issues is unclear. However,
we feel that there will be cases where it is difﬁcult or impossible to demonstrate healthcare relevance, and it
is therefore important to include these types of ﬁndings in our discussions for this paper.
32 The Nuremberg code, which followed on from the Nuremberg trials, established the principle of voluntary,
informed consent for research. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under
Control Council Law No. 10, (Vol. 2, US Government Printing Ofﬁce,1949) Art 1 at pp 181–2. The require-
ment of informed consent is further developed and enshrined in principle 24 of the World Medical Associ-
ation, ‘Declaration of Helsinki—Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects’.
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is evident in the movement within research and research ethics from an understanding
of participants solely as donors—providing bodily material for a researcher’s use with
no further link between the parties—to an understanding of research as a social enter-
prise in which researchers and participants are both variously engaged. Such a develop-
ment moves the researcher–participant encounter from an episode to a relationship
within the social endeavour of translational research. It also opens more widely consid-
eration of what parties owe to one another and the shared project, and on what
grounds these obligations are based. Full consideration of the nature of this relationship
is beyond the scope of this paper. In the current context, we consider how traditional
biomedical principles of beneﬁcence, non-malﬁcence, autonomy, and justice33 may be
employed in exploring participant access to research-generated genomic information.
Much of the bioethics literature to date has focussed on the researchers’ ethical obliga-
tions to disclose research data rather than the individual’s right of access.34 In consider-
ing the respective ethical rights and obligations on individual access to one’s genome,
the literature emphasises the researcher’s ‘offer’ to disclose research ﬁndings to partici-
pants and is largely silent on the participant’s claim to access genomic information
about themselves that is held by researchers. The claim for access therefore is tradition-
ally seen as a passive claim vis-à-vis the researcher’s (active) duty.35 From the research-
er’s perspective, arguments against disclosure have often focused on the distinction
between care and research and have centred on concerns over the therapeutic miscon-
ception and diagnostic misperception, occurrence of harm, the individual’s right not to
know, and whether high cost and time-intensive burdens of disclosure could be detri-
mental for individuals and for research.36 The focus has been on non-maleﬁcence.
33 T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979).
34 This literature is considerable. A symposium in the American Journal of Bioethics, 6:6, 2006, provides an
early indication of the move toward considering the obligations to feed back ﬁndings, which extends by
2013 to consideration of obligations actively to search for them. See C Gliwa and B Berkman, ‘Do
Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?’ (2013 ) 13 Am J
Bioeth 2 and peer responses.
35 AL Bredenoord and others (Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to Research Participants: the Debate
Reconsidered (2011) 27(2) Trends Genet 41–47) summarise that ‘[r]esearch results can be disclosed pas-
sively or actively’ and that ‘[p]assive disclosure refers to disclosure on explicit request by a research partici-
pant’. They further state that ‘[t]he right to have access to one’s personal, genetic, and medical data is
recognized in many international and national legal guidelines’. In support, the authors chieﬂy cite the
CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (2002) and
the Council for International CIOMS (Organizations of Medical Sciences) International Ethical Guide-
lines for Epidemiological Studies (2007). However, they immediately add that ‘[t]he central discussion in
this respect is not whether participants can access their data, but whether researchers should actively offer
genetic results to individual research participants’. Indeed, the CIOMS 2002 Guidelines state, under
Guideline 5 relating to Obtaining informed consent: Essential information for prospective research sub-
jects, under point 8 stipulate, that: ‘subjects have the right of access to their data on demand, even if these
data lack immediate clinical utility (unless the ethical review committee has approved temporary or perma-
nent non-disclosure of data, in which case the subject should be informed of, and given, the reasons for
such non-disclosure’. The same wording is used verbatim in the 2007 Guidelines as well. With the excep-
tion of these two documents—in essence, one document—we have found no other mention of an active
individual claim for access to research ﬁndings in previous or subsequent documents.
36 J Murphy and others, ‘Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-cohort Genetic Research’
(2008) 8(11) Am J Bioeth 36; offers a comprehensive literature overview of the various arguments in
favour of, and against disclosure.
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There has been a shift towards a more positive approach to notifying individuals of
participant-speciﬁc research ﬁndings, extending as far as discussion of the obligations to
look for moral obligations to do so.37 Arguments have been made to support the disclo-
sure of research results to participants which include respect for individual autonomy
and self-determination, the ethical prerogative to not regard the individual as a means
to an end, considerations of reciprocity, and furthering intelligent communication
between researchers and participants, which can foster trust and on-going public
involvement in research.38 The arguments for allowing access by participants in the
case of our four types of information are as follows.
A. Raw Data and General Research Findings
General research ﬁndings are often distributed to research participants and the wider
public through newsletters and websites as well as being made available through publi-
cations. Returning such ﬁndings to individuals is increasingly becoming part of
common practice and does not raise the same ethical questions as allowing access to
raw sequence data which relates to a speciﬁc individual. In the case of raw sequence
data, there are a number of reasons why individuals might not be given access. The
ﬁrst is that the sequence data developed through the research process is not at the
current time robust enough to be clinically useful. It would require a signiﬁcant
change in practice, protocols, and procedures to generate sequence information of a
sufﬁcient standard that could be given to individuals to form a basis for clinical
decision-making. To do so, would involve considerable time and money. These are
often the grounds on which feedback is refused.39 The principle at work is one of dis-
tributive justice, seeking to balance the request of participants with the resource prior-
ities of often publicly funded research. If individuals really want access to this
information, they could obtain it through other means such as a direct-to-consumer
genetic testing company which through the paid contractual nature of the arrange-
ment, would also take on the liability for the quality of the information.
On the other hand, there are strong intuitive counter-arguments that a whole
genome sequence is a unique identiﬁer and should be known by the person to whom
it relates. This would recognise that genomic information is unique to the individual
and so providing access to it could foster trust and on-going public involvement in
research as this would be in the spirit of beneﬁt sharing. These are often the motiva-
tions for providing research information through newsletters or websites. As genetic
tests become more common, the desire for information and the expectations of
37 Am J Bioeth 13:2, 2013; C Gliwa and B Berkman, ‘Response to Open Peer Commentaries on ‘Do
Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?’ (2013) 13 Am J Bioeth
5.
38 Ibid; also G Renegar and others, ‘Returning Genetic Research Results to Individuals: Points to Consider’
(2006) 20(1) Bioethics 24.
39 The Complainant v Queen’s University Belfast (FS50163282) (2010) illustrates the exemptions relied upon
by a public authority to refuse disclosure of information on such grounds, albeit it unsuccessfully; under
s12 FOIA, a request for information disclosure may be refused on the basis of costs. Regulation 12(4)(b)
of the EIR permits a public authority to refuse disclosure should the request be manifestly unreasonable, ie
where unreasonable costs would be incurred and where there would be an unreasonable diversion of
resources.
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research participants for receiving related results are on the increase.40 These more
recent practices also form part of a broader cultural change where individuals are
encouraged and become accustomed to actively seek—and also demand—more
information about themselves.41 To the extent that this information is related to their
health and living habits, it can ultimately lead to changes in how individuals perceive
themselves and take care of themselves and their relatives. These considerations also
ﬁnd resonance in recent UK policy recommendations to support individual ‘responsi-
bilisation’ in healthcare.42 There is increasing support that individuals should have
access to their own sequence data simply because it is ‘theirs’, even though the utility
of this information is still not fully understood. This recognises the autonomy of indi-
viduals. However, we consider that any interpretation of sequence information that
has clinical signiﬁcance has to be returned through a clinical context. This does not
rule out the possibility of returning an individual’s raw sequence data to them person-
ally if it were thought appropriate. Rather it is a recognition that part of respect and
dignity is the provision of material in a form in which it can be meaningful.
B. Participant-Speciﬁc Research Findings and Incidental Findings
In the case of patient-speciﬁc ﬁndings, a number of recent studies examined partici-
pants’ views about access to information results in genomic biobanking, which reveal
extensive support for knowing individual research ﬁndings.43 There are several
reasons why participants want to know this information, which range from health-
related reasons to a curiosity interest, to family-lineage and related expectations,
including self-discovery about one’s ethnicity or history, linked to tales of personal as
well as community identity and knowledge.44 This information could have signiﬁcant
implications for people’s health that could help them avoid life-threatening conditions
but also identify drugs that might be more suited to their metabolism using a person-
alised medicine approach. Access to this personal information may be crucial in
enabling participants to have a better understanding of their health conditions and
make health-related decisions accordingly. Genetic information is about identity as
well as health. Recognising this and sharing information that may not seem clinically
relevant but may be of import to a participant recognises that the interests of partici-
pants extend beyond those of research. Further, because it is a unique identiﬁer, an
individual’s genetic sequence is intensely personal. Individual dignity or respect for
persons can be recognised and supported through the provision of information that
40 McGuire and others, ‘Research Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-genome Sequencing’ (2008) 9(2) Nat
Rev Genet 152.
41 R Tutton and B Prainsack, ‘Enterprising or Altruistic Selves? Making up Research Subjects in Genetics
Research’ (2011) 33 Soc Health Illness 1081.
42 Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, ‘Medical Proﬁling and Online Medicine: The Ethics of ‘Personalised
Healthcare’ in a Consumer Age’ (Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics 2010) <http://www.nufﬁeldbioethics.org/
personalised-healthcare-0> accessed 12 March 2013.
43 B Godard, J Marshall, and C Laberge, ‘Community Engagement in Genetic Research: Results of the First
Public Consultation for the Quebec CARTaGENE Project’ (2007) 10(3) Commun Genet 147; K Hoeyer,
‘Donors Perceptions of Consent to and Feedback from Biobank Research: Time to Acknowledge Diver-
sity?’ (2010) 13 Public Health Genomics 345; Murphy and others, n 36 above; see Wendler and Emanuel,
n 18 above.
44 Beskow, n 18; Quaid and others, n 18; Ravitsky and Wilfond, n 18; Wendler and Emanuel, n 18.
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provides non-clinical meaning related to identity and familial relationships. Dignity
can also be seen as a form of informational integrity: the privacy of individuals
vis-a-vis such deeply personal information is equally important and places a duty on
researchers to develop robust systems for information security. Where the old guaran-
tees of anonymity are no longer possible, it is necessary to ﬁnd other ways to safe-
guard these same values. Disclosing research results to participants adheres to the
principle of respect of persons and the notion that individuals have the right, as self-
determining agents, to receive research results if they so choose.45 Providing such
results could encourage greater awareness of the beneﬁts of research and in doing so
would lead to greater public support for biomedical research.46 There is a danger that
if serious treatable conditions are not reported back to individuals that this would
affect public opinion negatively towards research.47 It would be considered morally
reprehensible for a researcher to know that an individual had a serious treatable condi-
tion but to decide not to alert the participant or their treating physician. This could
have a detrimental effect on the public’s trust and support of researchers, and it could
be argued that giving participants access to such information has the potential to
place the relationship between researchers and research participants on more equal
terms.48 Various approaches are proposed to give greater consideration to research
participants’ views and for research participants to express their preferences on the
types of information they wish to receive through choosing various notiﬁcation
options of research results, usually at the moment of enrolment but also beyond.49
Such approaches would also support a participants’ desire not to know certain ﬁnd-
ings or the right not to know. There could be negative effects on individuals if they do
receive such information which cannot be acted upon. This may increase anxiety and
so information should only be fed back if there are immediate clinical beneﬁts.
From the participant’s perspective, there are a number of compelling reasons why
they might want to access personal genome information. As research knowledge
becomes more available to the general public because of open access policies and as
the implication of the genome on disease susceptibility and drug metabolism is better
understood, this information will be signiﬁcant and more accessible to the general
public. Therefore, it would be unethical not to provide access to such information
45 CV Fernandez and C Weijer, ‘Obligations in Offering to Disclose Genetic Research Results’ (2008) 6(6)
Am J Bioeth 44; DI Shalowitz and FG Miller, ‘Communicating the Results of Clinical Research to Partici-
pants: Attitudes, Practices, and Future Directions’ (2008) 5(5) PLoS Med e91 <http://www.plosmedicine
.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050091> accessed 12 March 2013.
46 CV Fernandez and C Weijer, ibid.
47 HT Greely, ‘The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-scale Genomic Biobanks’ (2007) 8
Annu Rev Genomics Hum Genet 343.
48 SM Wolf, ‘Incidental Findings in Neuroscience Research: A Fundamental Challenge to the Structure of
Bioethics and Heealth Law’, in J Illes, B Sahakian (eds), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics (OUP, Oxford,
2011) 623–34; the author stipulates that ‘. . .[b]ioethics and health law must now reconstitute the tradi-
tional vision of researcher duties to bring the researcher back into relationship with the research partici-
pant. . .’ and that ‘. . .[r]esearchers are no longer free to work with their data in splendid isolation. . .’.
49 Murphy and others, n 36; Ravitsky and Wilfond, n 18; MA Rothstein, ‘Tiered Disclosure Options Promote
the Autonomy and Well-being of Research Subjects’ (2006) 6(6) Am J Bioethic 20. Recent research trends
develop ways to integrate dynamic management of consent preferences, including tiered notiﬁcation pref-
erences as part of user-interactive biobanking interfaces.
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that was held by researchers, if it was in a form that was useful for clinical care, and if
individuals wanted to have access to their speciﬁc information. While these arguments
are compelling in terms of respect for persons and autonomy, they would require a
signiﬁcant change in the way that research is carried out and healthcare is delivered,
but also in terms of current law surrounding access to personal information in
the UK.
V. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Oviedo Convention of 1997 (on Human Rights and Biomedicine),50 and its
Additional Protocol of 2008 (concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes)51
assert that individuals are entitled to know any information collected about their
health,52 which may be derived from a genetic test.53 It should also be noted that
both the Convention and Additional Protocol qualify these provisions with reference
to an individual’s rights not to know about, or have access to this type of information.
As signiﬁcant and wide-reaching as these European rights of access to health informa-
tion appear, they have no legal force in the UK beyond mere persuasion, as neither
the Convention nor Additional Protocol have been signed or ratiﬁed. To assert
similar rights of access in the UK, individuals must instead rely on speciﬁc national
legislation, namely the Data Protection Act 1998; the Freedom of Information Act
2000; and the Human Rights Act 1998.
All of these statutes in principle uphold a right of access, but they are all subject to
a variety of qualiﬁcations. Before analysing them in more detail, it is worthwhile con-
sidering the wider culture in the UK as regards access to medical information more
generally. In the healthcare setting—indeed enshrined within the NHS Constitution
—patients have a right of access to their own health records.54 The statutory basis for
this right is found primarily in data protection law, but other acts come into play in
certain scenarios.55 When it comes to research, it would seem that the default position
is for participants not to be given access to individual-level genomic information
largely because the quality of the sequencing and the fact that results may not have
clinical validity or utility. This position, which clearly differs from the situation in the
provision of healthcare, appears to have been adopted in an attempt to avoid compli-
cating the research process, and overburdening researchers with non-research tasks.
But to what extent would the law in the UK—namely the three speciﬁc Acts referred
to above—support a research participant seeking to gain access to such information?
50 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
Oviedo, 4.IV.1997.
51 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning
Genetic Testing for Health Purposes. Strasbourg, 27.XI.2008.
52 Oviedo Convention, Art 10(2).
53 Additional Protocol, Art 16(2).
54 ‘The NHS Constitution, the NHS belongs to us all’, (8 March 2010): ‘You have the right of access to your
own health records. These will always be used to manage your treatment in your best interests’ at page 8
<http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Pages/Overview.aspx>
accessed 12 March 2013.
55 Access to Health Records Act 1990; Access to Medical Reports Act 1988.
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A. Data Protection Act 1998
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)56 is the keystone in UK information law, and it
regulates the use of personal data held manually and on computer. The aim of the Act
is to protect the rights of individuals (‘the data subject’) about whom data are
obtained, stored, processed, or supplied.
The DPA only applies to data that have not been successfully anonymised. In
order for the DPA to apply, the ‘personal data’ must relate to a living individual who
can be identiﬁed from those data, or from those data and other information in the
data controller’s possession. The question of whether the data are anonymised
depends to a great extent upon the security and non-disclosure safeguards that are put
in place, such as removing identiﬁers, coding, ﬁrewalls, and aggregating data sets. In
many cases, researchers involved in genomic research use systems such as coding
(codes held by third parties) to anonymise the data to protect the privacy of research
participants and individual researchers are not in a position to identify a research par-
ticipant. It is therefore unclear as to whether the research results constitute anony-
mised ‘personal data’ for the purposes of the DPA. If data can be successfully
anonymised, then the DPA does not apply. If the data used in genomic research is
not truly anonymised, then it will fall within the ambit of the DPA, provided that such
data also constitute ‘personal data’ for the purposes of the DPA. As technology
improves and whole genome sequencing (at high resolution) becomes increasingly
common, de-identiﬁcation of data will become more difﬁcult. Although sequencing
technology and coding techniques may still mean that DNA itself does not constitute
‘personal data’, for the rest of this DPA analysis, the assumption is made that genomic
research data can be regarded as personal data.
Personal data must be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects pro-
vided under the DPA.57 Although section 7 DPA gives data subjects a right of access
to a copy of the information comprising their personal data and a description of the
personal data (subject to a small administrative charge), the rights of access are cir-
cumscribed by the so-called research exemption. The research exemption in section
33 DPA applies where the following relevant conditions are met:
1. the data are not processed to support measures or decisions with respect to
particular individuals, and
2. the data are not processed in such a way that substantial damage or
substantial distress is, or is likely to be, caused to any data subject.
Where section 33 applies, subject access does not have to be given if the data are pro-
cessed in compliance with the relevant conditions, and the results of the research or
any resulting statistics are not made available in a form which identiﬁes data sub-
jects.58 Assuming that genomic researchers do not deviate from standard ethical
56 The Data Protection Act implements the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC which relates to the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such
data.
57 Schedule 1, Part I, 6.
58 S 33(4)(a) and (b).
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practice, section 33 should severely limit the use of section 7 for genomic research
feedback requests. The exemption will apply in most cases in which requests for
access to a research participant’s genomic information is made.
Participants face another small hurdle in section 7(4) DPA, which states that com-
plying with an access request is not required if to do so would mean disclosing infor-
mation about another individual who can be identiﬁed from that information, except
where the other individual has consented to the disclosure, or it is reasonable in all
the circumstances to comply with the request without that individual’s consent. If the
analysis of the participant’s genome depends on a comparison with another person’s
data, then it could be argued that subsection (4) is applicable. The reasonableness
test in subsection (6) does not explicitly look at the requesting participant’s need for
access to the information, but rather considers the relationship between the researcher
and the other individual.
There is a ﬁnal hurdle in section 8 DPA, which provides that a copy of the informa-
tion in permanent form does not have to be supplied if the supply of such a copy is
not possible or would involve disproportionate effort. The effort and cost needed to
extract and supply individual information from genomic research could be considered
disproportionate. The Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce emphasises that a narrow
interpretation of ‘supply’ should be made (i.e. that it should be restricted to the actual
act of communicating the information), and it stresses that the provision should only
be used in exceptional cases;59 so this provision may not present much of an obstacle
to a requesting participant.
This leads to the conclusion that the DPA is unlikely to provide genomic
research participants with a right to access their genomic information. Even if
DNA is determined to be personal data (which is unlikely until advances in tech-
nology and sequence sharing are made), the exemptions to the rights of access are
such that refusal to grant access will be acceptable. There are good reasons why
researchers and their institutions might be reluctant to provide this information
to individuals, as to do so would require the development of new management
pathways. However, the proposed changes to European data protection law
would include ‘genetic data’ as personal information and therefore all of these dif-
ferent types of genetic information may in the future be considered as personal
information.60
B. Freedom of Information Act 2000
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) establishes the legal framework for
access to information held by public authorities. An individual has the right to request
information held by a public sector organisation under the FOIA, which became law
in the UK in January 2005. The FOIA creates a statutory right of access and provides
59 The Guide to Data Protection: <http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/
practical_application/the_guide_to_data_protection.pdf> accessed 30 July 2013.
60 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Pro-
tection Regulation) 2012/0011, Released 25/1/2012.
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an extensive scheme for making information publicly available, which covers a wide
range of public authorities, such as the NHS, local government, and education.
The FOIA applies to information held by public authorities and information held
by other persons on their behalf. The FOIAwill only be useful to research participants
if it is determined that DNA itself is not personal data. Currently, we do not have any
case law or decision on this speciﬁc point. Section 40 FOIA provides that if the infor-
mation requested is the participant’s personal data, then the DPA applies, and the
FOIA does not, in which case only the DPA analysis above is then relevant. If it is
another person’s personal data, then it must comply with the data protection princi-
ples set out in the DPA, and disclosure of the information must not cause damage or
distress (unless the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in
keeping the exemption—the public interest test). The case of Common Services
Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner (Scotland)61 demonstrates how the FOIA
and the DPA work together:62 if the data can be sufﬁciently anonymised, their disclo-
sure falls under the standard FOIA provisions; if they cannot be, it has to comply with
the DPA principles.63,64
The FOIA further provides that disclosing the information must not be a breach of
conﬁdence to a third party,65 and the information should not constitute a trade secret
or prejudice the commercial interests of any person.66 The breach of conﬁdence
exemption would severely limit a research participant’s right of access to other
people’s data under the FOIA, as it is difﬁcult to imagine an example of medical
research in which divulging another person’s personal data without consent would
not be a breach of conﬁdence.67 Furthermore, given the commercial value of some
research, perhaps the exemption will regularly be engaged.68
Perhaps the most relevant exemption is that regarding information intended for
future publication contained in section 22 FOIA. For it to apply, at the time the
request is made, the public authority must actually have an intention to publish the
61 [2008] UKHL 47.
62 Although this concerned The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act, the point should apply to the
FOIA.
63 It is interesting to consider that, if the data are sufﬁciently anonymised, and a participant successfully uses
the FOIA to gain access to their data, the data will have to be personalised to identify which data are the
participant’s, and then the DPAwill apply.
64 Department of Health v Information Commissioner [2011] EWHC 1430 (Admin).
65 S 41.
66 S 43.
67 However, the breach of conﬁdence exemption is subject to a public interest test. For example, if the
request for disclosure of information is made by a third party who is a relative of the data subject, and the
information reveals that the relative is at a high risk of suffering serious and preventable physical harm as a
result of a condition that he or she could be unaware of, in principle, the leading case on disclosure in the
public interest (W v Egdell [1990] Ch 395) would apply, and disclosure should be permitted. For general
discussion, see D Bell and B Bennett, ‘Genetic Secrets and the Family’ [2001] Med L Rev 130; P Case,
‘Conﬁdence Matters: The Rise and Fall of Informational Autonomy in Medical Law’ (2003) 11 Med L
Rev 208; R Gilbar, ‘Medical Conﬁdentiality within the Family’ (2004) 18 IJLPF 195; L Skene, ‘Genetic
Secrets and the Family’ (2001) 6 Med L Rev 1; S Liao, ‘Is There a Duty to Share Genetic Information?’
(2009) 35 J Med E 306; L Fleck, ‘When Is My Genetic Information Your Business’ (2010) Camb Q
Healthcare Ethics 27; M Taylor, ‘Health Research, Data Protection, and the Public Interest in Notiﬁcation’
(2011) 19 Med L Rev 267.
68 Again, the commercial interest exemption is subject to a public interest test.
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information (or someone else must have an intention to publish it),69 and, if it does,
it must be reasonable in the circumstances that the information should be withheld
from disclosure until the publishing date. It must also satisfy the public interest test
(whereby the public interest in disclosure must outweigh the public interest in
keeping the exemption). The underlying thinking behind the exemption is that, if the
applicant will be able to obtain the information by another means, there is no need
for a separate statutory route, and so the information must be published at some
point in the near future, or a refusal to provide will probably be deemed to be unrea-
sonable. Perhaps the fact that the information will be used for research and all the
associated reasons against disclosing research ﬁndings early, for example a reduction
in academic incentive,70 will help an authority to argue that its refusal to disclose
before the publication date is reasonable and in the public interest.71
In addition, section 21 FOIA provides that: ‘Information which is reasonably accessi-
ble to the applicant otherwise than under section 1 is exempt information.’ As obtaining
one’s genome sequence becomes cheaper and easier, it may seem that this is more
likely to be satisﬁed if a research participant is simply asking for his or her sequence; it
must be remembered, however, that the FOIA deals with information—the speciﬁc
genomic information that researchers hold about their participants will not be available
from anyone else. Conclusively, the ICO’s guidance on section 21 suggests that, for the
information to be reasonably accessible, charges can only be made if a statutory scheme
provides for a fee-charging information provider, or if the information is provided under
the researching authority’s publication scheme;72 neither of these cover where private
genome sequence providers charge for their services.
The FOIA will, in general, not be useful to research participants, particularly
because of the section 22 exemption and the fact that it cannot be used to access per-
sonal data. If a research participant wants general information about the research, this
may be possible, but this would be unlikely in most genomic projects where there is
an intention to publish the data at a later date, and a refusal to divulge the data before
this date is reasonable.
C. Human Rights Act 1998
We have seen how data protection and freedom of information laws—areas of the law
whose very existence is rooted in human rights—can be used as the basis for a claim
69 Although a distinction has been made between raw data and the research results reliant on this data (The
Complainant v Queen’s University Belfast (FS50163282) (2010)), this distinction was speciﬁcally made with
reference to Regulation 12(4)(d) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR), which pro-
vides for possible exception to disclosing environmental information on the grounds of information being
unﬁnished and incomplete.
70 See the last paragraph of the Human Rights Law section General Feedback Requests and n 7 above.
71 It is worth noting that The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act contains an exemption for information
obtained in the course of a research project, requiring substantial prejudice to the research programme, its
participants, or the institution for the exemption to apply; perhaps the Information Commissioner could
use the substantial detriment test as a basis for a decision as to the reasonableness of a refusal to supply
information that will be published.
72 Freedom of Information Act Awareness, Guidance Number 6; <http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/
library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/awareness_guidance_6_-_information_
reasonably_accessible_to_the_applicant_by_other_means.pdf> accessed 30 July 2013.
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for access to information in speciﬁc circumstances, but what of a claim based on a
more general application of an individual’s rights under the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention)?73
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into force in 2000, UK law must
be interpreted and applied by courts in a manner compatible with the Convention.
The decade of case law that has resulted dwells on two broad categories of dispute:
ﬁrstly, those where a ‘public authority’74 (or some other legal entity ‘whose functions
are of a public nature’75) are alleged to be acting in contravention of the Convention;
and, secondly, those where Convention rights are sought to be applied in ways that
create legal obligations on private individuals. In short, there are public and private
dimensions to human rights law, with the latter being confusing territory for individu-
als to bring claims in. Before considering such claims in more detail, it is worth stating
that there would, inevitably, be some similarities between a ‘pure’ human rights claim
and those made under the more speciﬁc legislation already discussed, and it is
perhaps unlikely that a claimant in a UK court would seek only to arm themselves
with the Convention as a means of getting access to genomic information. Nonethe-
less, an examination of how certain Convention rights could bolster such a claim is a
useful exercise.
Given the public/private dimension of human rights cases, the founding of any
claim would turn on who and what the defendant is, and upon what basis they seek to
deny the claimant access to information. If the defendant in question were a public
authority or similar entity—for example the NHS, universities undertaking publicly
funded work/functions of a public nature, or indeed the UK Biobank76—then the
standing of a claim would be on ﬁrm ground. Seeking redress against a private defen-
dant, for example a direct-to-consumer genetic test provider, with no obvious public
function (and no doubt further supported, contractually, by its own standard terms
and conditions) would still be possible. As the European Court of Human Rights has
made clear, while the essential object of the autonomy-friendly Article 8 is to protect
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not
merely compel the state to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private
or family life.77 These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals
between themselves. This was most recently emphasised in Mosley v United
Kingdom78 and Von Hannover (No.2) v Germany.79 This approach is also consistent
with the Court’s emphasis that the Convention is dynamic, reﬂective of social changes
73 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1).
74 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1).
75 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(3)(b).
76 C Johnston and J Kaye, ‘Does the UK Biobank Have a Legal Obligation to Feedback Individual Findings
to Participants?’ (2004) 12(3) Med L Rev 239.
77 See Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 at [57]; and Stubbings v United Kingdom (1997) 23
EHRR 213 at [61]–[62].
78 Application No. 48009/08, 10 May 2011 (2011) 53 EHRR 30 at [106].
79 Von Hannover No.2 (Case Nos 40660/08 and 60641/08) 7 February 2012 [2012] EMLR 16 at [98].
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and ‘a living instrument which should be interpreted according to present-day condi-
tions’.80
Article 8 is a qualiﬁed right and its application could be considered as a two-stage
test: ﬁrstly, assess whether the rights set out in Article 8(1) are ‘engaged’; secondly, if
Article 8(1) is engaged, determine whether any of the exceptions in Article 8(2)—
which include the protection of health—override application of the rights. The
reasons for a claim will therefore be relevant: is the claimant merely curious as to the
information about him held by others, or are there other genuine concerns such as
health matters, paternity, or an interest in ancestry behind a request? There is, of
course, a qualiﬁed right of access to personal data under the DPA that would seem to
permit genuine curiosity-based applications. Article 8 could be cited as giving further
support to such applications, but in reality such applications will only be data protec-
tion claims. It is perhaps because of the particular nature of genomic information—
whether it is considered ‘health’ or ‘medical’ in nature81—that Article 8 could provide
some added weight to a claim for access, and there is judicial authority to back this
up, as discussed below.
Before turning to rights of access per se, it is worth considering the more general
application of Article 8 of the Convention to genetic information. In 2004, the House
of Lords, when questioning the retention practices of DNA samples by the police in
the Marper case,82 held that such practices did not engage Article 8(1), and in any
event were justiﬁed by Article 8(2). A dissenting opinion of Baroness Hale, which was
endorsed when the case was heard by the European Court of Human Rights in
2008,83 was notable for its observation that ‘there can be little, if anything, more
private to the individual than the knowledge of his genetic make-up’.84 In light of this
judgment in Strasbourg, the original Marper decision was deemed unlawful by the
UK Supreme Court in 2011.85 There is additional authority from Strasbourg that
Article 8(1) is engaged by the systematic retention of DNA samples, with justiﬁcation
founded upon the use which such samples ‘could conceivably be put in the future’.86
The European Court of Human Rights in the case of K.H. v Slovakia87 afﬁrmed
that an individual’s right of effective access to personal data—without the need for
justiﬁcation—engages Article 8. Here requests made by several women, all of whom
suspected they had been sterilised without their permission, for copies of data con-
cerning their fertility were denied by a Slovakian public authority. The court held that
the failure by the authority to uphold this right of access, without compelling reasons,
constituted a breach of Article 8: in other words, the burden of proof should rest with
80 Tyrer v United Kingdom, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 1, at [31]; Selmouni v France, (2000) 29 EHRR 403 at [101].
81 A distinction has been drawn between such terms in various discussions about the regulation of access to
genetic information, but we are not aware of any particular legal distinction, and do not seek to create one
here.
82 R (S) v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police and R (Marper) v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire
Police [2004] 1 WLR 2196.
83 S. and Marper v The United Kingdom (2008) 158 NLJ 1755, [2008] ECHR 1581, (2009) 48 EHRR 50, 25
BHRC 557, 48 EHRR 50. [2009] Crim LR 355 at [72].
84 LS, R (on application of) v South Yorkshire Police (Consolidated Appeals) [2004] UKHL 3 at [71].
85 GC v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21.
86 Hendrik Jan van der Velden v the Netherlands [2006] ECHR 1174.
87 K.H. and others v Slovakia App 32881/04 [2009] ECHR 709.
Can I Access My Personal Genome? • 81
 at U
niversity of Exeter on N
ovem
ber 19, 2014
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
the public authority to justify a refusal of access. While this ruling suggests that a
public authority must, in general, supply medical records, it should be borne in mind
that the court emphasised that the women’s ‘moral and physical integrity’ was particu-
larly relevant in this case, quite possibly due to the original lack of consent. In the less
extreme case of participants in genomic research, who will have been required to sign
an informed consent form prior to their involvement, a similar application of Article 8
cannot be guaranteed, particularly given the qualiﬁed nature of existing access rights
under data protection law in the context of research. Another more recent case, Gill-
berg v Sweden,88 though not addressing the rights of access for research participants
per se, makes it clear that assurances of conﬁdentiality as between researcher and
research participant will never be absolute.89 In this case, K and E, a sociologist and
paediatrician, were granted access to conﬁdential information by the Administrative
Court of Appeal on certain conditions because they had shown a legitimate interest in
the material in question.90 Their familiarity with the handling of conﬁdential data, as
well as the importance of independent validation of the methods used in research also
weighed heavily in the Court’s decision to allow access.91 This suggests that conﬁden-
tiality may be trumped in certain situations where access to health information such
as genomic information is required, for example, for further research use. Most perti-
nently, the court held that strict legal foundations of conﬁdentiality (the Swedish
Secrecy Act in this case) should take precedence over claims made in consent forms,
and international instruments such as the Helsinki Declaration. While Gillberg
addressed requests for access by researchers, it can serve as a reminder of the balance
between conﬁdentiality and access requests by genomic research participants, given
the potential for genomic information to reveal conﬁdential information about others.
However, some commentators have argued that the case of Gillberg suggests that the
Strasbourg courts might be moving towards a right of access.92
VI . LEGAL RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THE FOUR TYPES OF GENOMIC
INFORMATION
Our classiﬁcation of genomic information comprises four categories that could con-
ceivably be generated in most biomedical research: raw data; general research ﬁnd-
ings; patient speciﬁc research ﬁndings; and patient-speciﬁc incidental ﬁndings. In all
cases, it is likely that proper application of the FOIA and DPA will, on the assumption
that both these Acts are compliant with the Convention, severely limit the scope for
human rights-based claims of access.
(i) Raw data (which consists of the SNP information, or a complete genetic
sequence, and can be represented as a read out of the base pair sequence on an indi-
vidual’s genome): These data stand a chance of being classed as personal data under
88 41723/06 [2010] ECHR 1676 (2 November 2010).
89 Ibid at [112]–[114] and the concurring opinion of Judge Power.
90 In the period between 1977 and 1992, a research project was carried out at the University of Gothenburg
in the ﬁeld of neuropsychiatry focusing on the incidences of Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) or Deﬁcits in Attention, Motor Control and Perception (DAMP) in children.
91 See concurring opinion of Judge Power.
92 M Spurrier, ‘Gillberg v Sweden: Towards a Right of Access to Information Under Article 10?’(2012) 5
EHRLR 551–8.
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present legislation,93 and thus caught by the subject access right of the DPA. Unlikely
as this may be, the research exemption in the DPA would certainly present the
researcher with a very strong basis upon which to resist such an application. The
quality of raw data—which constitutes reams of many thousands of base pairs—is
such that decisions about individuals using these data would be all but impossible:
this would be the deciding factor in the successful application of the ﬁrst part of the
research exemption.94 If not personal data, there could be scope for a request under
the FOIA if the research was conducted by a public authority95though it is very likely
that such an application would be defeated on the grounds that the same information
would, ultimately, be published in line with standard academic practices.96,97
(ii) General research ﬁndings (which are ﬁndings obtained from the analysis of the
study): This information will not be personal data under the DPA, and accordingly
the right of subject access will not materialise. Similarly, the lack of a direct link to an
individual will doubtless prevent application of Article 8, or Article 2, of the Conven-
tion. As with raw data, a request to a public authority under the FOIA will again be
subject to the publication exemption.
(iii) Patient-speciﬁc research ﬁndings (which are results of the particular study
which have relevance to an individual patient): Clearly, this type of information
stands a reasonable chance of being personal data, even if it is of a speculative nature.
If sufﬁciently personal, getting the research exemption to apply to this category of
genomic information may not be quite as straightforward as in the case of raw data.
The ability of a researcher to deny access based on this exemption will hang on the
signiﬁcance of the data to the individual—if the data are so serious that any processing
of them (without knowledge of the participant, it is assumed) constituted life or
death matters, then the exemption is less likely to apply. Such considerations will,
most likely, require further research to ascertain the signiﬁcance of the information; if
this is the case, then the exemption is likely to apply. FOIA considerations will be the
same as the previous two categories.
(iv) Patient-speciﬁc incidental ﬁndings (which are not directly related to the
purpose of the study): This information stands the greatest chance of being personal
data, and therefore it may be difﬁcult to use the research exemption as the basis for
rejecting a subject access request. We say this because a researcher processing this
type of information, particularly if it relates to health issues will have had to depart
from the stated objectives of the research exemption that the information in question
will not be of real signiﬁcance to an individual, or individuals. The difﬁculty here is
93 Under Art 9 of the draft General Data Protection Regulation however, genetic data will explicitly be classed
as a special category of personal data.
94 DPA, s 33(1)(a).
95 The concern that raw data in itself may not serve any meaningful purpose when assessing its possible publi-
cation has not been considered as a valid reason for non-disclosure as stated in The Complainant v Queen’s
University Belfast (FS50163282) (2010). It is important to note that the Information Commissioner’s com-
ments in this decision were made with respect to possible disclosure of environmental information, which
falls under the scope of the EIR and not the FOIA.
96 FOIA, s 22.
97 Current practice, however, reveals that there is a high trend where scientists do not in fact publish raw data.
AA Alsheikh-Ali and others ‘Public Availability of Published Research Data in High-Impact Journals’
(2011) 6 (9) PLoS ONE e24357 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024357.
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that paternity and ancestry information as well as health information could be found
out from an analysis of sequence data and may also be of signiﬁcance to the individ-
ual. This could be of interest to research participants and of real signiﬁcance, but may
not be gleaned from all research analyses. The more speciﬁc these enquiries become,
the more likely the data are personal, and the less likely that both limbs of the research
exemption will apply. In the unlikely event that the ﬁndings were not considered per-
sonal, then application to a qualifying researcher under the FOIA would again meet
resistance through the publication exemption. This is based on the assumption that
the researchers would still pursue publication of such information, even though it was
not part of the original research plan.
VII . CONCLUSIONS
It is evident from our analysis that participants in genomics research under current UK
law have very limited rights to access the four types of information identiﬁed in this
paper. However, the proposed changes to European data protection law may have
implications for an individual’s right of access to personal genetic information. At this
time, it is not clear what the new European regulations will contain. Currently, individu-
als would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to establish a right of access in the case of raw sequence data
and general research ﬁndings generated through the research process, but this is less
certain in the case of patient speciﬁc research ﬁndings and patient-speciﬁc incidental
ﬁndings. It is the individual-level data, which have implications for individuals that
present the most challenges in terms of a legal right of access to this information by
individuals. The strongest claim for access that could be made would be in relation to
information with speciﬁc relevance to health and reproduction (or arguably paternity or
ancestry), but even so, through the current legal avenues that exist in the UK it would
be difﬁcult for an individual to access data generated through the research process.
At the present time, the law strikes an appropriate balance in its attitude to the provi-
sion of genomic information, and that these limited rights of access are broadly appro-
priate, for two reasons. Firstly, at present, the information generated in the four
categories identiﬁed is of limited signiﬁcance and use to individuals in contrast to more
deﬁned and speciﬁc medical information, which is available through the medical record.
However, as medical knowledge and technology develops, more situations may arise
where there is a legitimate claim to access genomic information, particularly where this
has direct medical relevance to the patient and has clinical utility. There is an impetus
towards revealing more information to patients and participants, demonstrated by the
ACMG report on incidental ﬁndings.98 These guidelines will have an international
effect, and although they were targeted at clinical care rather than research, they chal-
lenge our perception of what information should be fed back. While the law in this
rapidly evolving area may be adequate for now, it is unlikely to stay so for long.
However, to make research data available to participants requires that the interface
between clinical care and research be more closely aligned. This information should be
in the medical record and then a patient should have an almost unfettered right of
access, but currently research results are not always recorded in this way.
98 See n 9 above.
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Secondly, there needs to be a consideration of the costs involved in providing
access to such information for research participants. To develop appropriate manage-
ment pathways will involve the allocation and expenditure of resources as well as the
development of appropriate expertise. A clear policy decision would have to be made
if such costs were to be borne by the research enterprise. For example, systems would
need to be in place to ensure that there are appropriate quality controls so that infor-
mation from the research context can be utilised in the clinic. These translational
research models are starting to become more common in the UK and provide a way
for information to be used and returned to individuals in an ethical manner. However,
the research and clinical domains are regulated in very different ways and to ask
researchers to provide feedback on individual ﬁndings would be inappropriate without
the development of appropriate management pathways that only currently exist for
clinically based research.
The use of whole genome sequencing is becoming more routine within research
with more projects99 having the expertise and the funding to be able to carry out this
type of investigation. As the costs of sequencing plummet and techniques become
more reﬁned, it is likely that whole genome sequencing technology will be used more
frequently in genomic projects but also more generally in disease-based research. The
vision for 2020 is that there may be considerable advances in knowledge that will
enable genomic discoveries to be translated into clinical outcomes or what is becom-
ing known as genomic medicine. However at the present time, this is not the case.100
In this scenario, whole genome sequencing will be a routine part of clinical care,101
sequence information being easily accessible to doctors and a component part of an
individual’s medical record. This means that questions about access to an individual’s
personal genome will become even more pertinent and the compelling moral argu-
ments that an individual should have access to their personal genome will become
more difﬁcult to rebut.
Within the commercial sector, direct-to-consumer testing companies are already
offering results based on genome sequencing102 and starting to develop the practices
and know-how that will enable them to integrate whole genome sequencing into the
services that they currently provide to consumers. There is the increasing likelihood
that individuals in society can and do access information about their genome through
commercial providers. Whilst researchers may rest assured that they will not be faced
with a deluge of successful claims to access to information from research, on the other
hand, medical practitioners are likely to be faced with an ever increasing number of
99 For example the 1000Genomes Project <http://www.1000genomes.org/> and the UK10K Project <http
://www.uk10k.org/> accessed 30 July 2013.
100 EDGreen, MS Guyer, and the National Genome Research Institute, ‘Charting a Course for Genomic Med-
icine from Base Pairs to Bedside’ (2011) 470 Nature 204.
101 Both these current and prospective advances have consequently called for greater regulation in a bid to
better protect individuals with regards to the processing of personal data. The EU draft General Data Pro-
tection Regulation, published in January 2012, reﬂects the intended increase of individuals to control their
data—European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 ﬁnal, Brussels, 25 January 2012.
102 This is not whole genome sequencing but only partial as it focuses on speciﬁc single-nucleotide polymor-
phisms on the genome rather than all of the bases pairs in the genome.
Can I Access My Personal Genome? • 85
 at U
niversity of Exeter on N
ovem
ber 19, 2014
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
patients wishing to have information about their genome interpreted and used to
inform medical treatment. Thus, even in the absence of the right of access discussed
in this paper, we feel it is essential that the implications of the growth of genomic
information for the healthcare system be addressed and the way that this is changing
the nature of the relationship between research participants and researchers. Appro-
priate policies need to be developed to deal with the greater use of whole genome
sequencing, and how this information might be accessed by the individuals who
provide it, not just to inform research but also to inform an individual’s healthcare
decision-making.
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